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From a game theoretic point of view, fraudulent accounting to em-
bellish the financial status of a firm and the use of drugs to enhance
performance in sports are very similar. We study the replicator dy-
namics of both applications within the same model. We allow for het-
erogenous populations, such as highly talented versus more mediocre
athletes, or high quality managers versus less able colleagues. Inter-
estingly, for some parameters, the replicator dynamics is character-
ized by cycles. Thus, we may see cycles of doping and clean sport,
and cycles of fraudulent and honest accounting. Moreover, in some
cases, high ability players are more likely to commit fraud than low
ability types. (JEL: C7, M4)
1 Introduction
We study a certain class of games, called doping games. A doping game is similar
to a rank-order tournament in the sense that two or more parties are assumed to
compete for a prize. Only the winner receives a payoff. Players may come in
different types indicating their talent. It would seem natural to assume that highly
talented contestants also have a higher probability to win. In a doping game,
∗We thank the anonymous referees for diligent reviews.
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however, players can enhance their performance with a costly activity which we
will call “doping.”1
Interpreting “doping” literally, the description of such games fits the use of
performance-enhancing drugs in sports rather well, and we will indeed couch our
discussion of the model in these terms. But, as the title suggests, the game we
analyze is amenable to interpretations outside of sports. Think, for instance, of a
contest between two division managers who compete for being promoted to the
top management level. The contestants may have different abilities (strong and
weak). The contestant whose division performs better will be promoted. The
“performance enhancing drug” may be fraudulent misrepresentation of perfor-
mance: it has a cost (the manager who is caught cheating will be penalized), but
also enhances the probability of promotion. As in a sport contest, there is just one
prize (one promotion) to be distributed, so cheating exerts a negative externality
on competitors. Stretching the analogy a bit, we may also interpret the game in
terms of companies competing for investors. The prize that the CEO of the com-
pany receives who reports the highest profit and who can convince the public of
its bright future is most likely to keep his job and to receive a large bonus. Em-
bellishing the financial status of the firm redirects capital from competing firms to
the cheater, so as before, there is an externality. Cheating is achieved in that case
with the help of an auditor. In that sense, Enron and Worldcom may be viewed as
cases of doping, and Arthur Andersen was their amphetamine.
Having analyzed doping and fraudulent behavior as equilibrium phenomenon,
it seems logical to also discuss policy measures against such behavior. In this short
paper, however, we discuss measures that are available for reducing or inhibiting
doping only shortly in section 4.2. For a fuller discussion of such issues in the
context of doping games, see BERENTSEN [2002] and BERENTSEN, BRU¨GGER,
AND LO¨RTSCHER [2003].
The simplest version of a doping game has two players with equal talent who
compete for a prize. Given their equal abilities each contestant has a fifty percent
chance of winning. By taking some drug (or committing fraud), a contestant can
increase his odds of winning at the expense of his clean (or honest) competitor.
If both players dope, the odds of winning are again fifty-fifty, but both players
also bear the cost of doping. The game has therefore the structure of a prisoner’s
dilemma. If the costs of doping are not prohibitive, doping is a dominant strategy.
1The classic reference on rank-order tournaments is LAZEAR AND ROSEN [1981]. The litera-
ture that followed this seminal contribution does typically not address issues of dynamics, which
are at the center of the present paper.
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In this paper, we study the replicator dynamics of doping games between dif-
ferently talented competitors. The underlying game is a so-called bimatrix game.
In contrast to games in which all players are symmetric (same set of strategies
and same payoffs), bimatrix games are used to analyze situations with different
types of agents. A typical bimatrix game is the battle of the sexes where there is a
conflict concerning parental investment between males and females [HOFBAUER
AND SIGMUND, 1998, p. 113ff] or the two population matching game [WEIBULL,
1995, p. 176ff]. For the most part, we restrict attention to games between just two
types of players (weak and strong), but we also discuss an example of contests
between three types of players. Interestingly, for some parameters, the replicator
dynamics is characterized by cycles similar to the cycles observed in matching
pennies games. Thus, we may see cycles of doping and clean sport, and cycles of
fraudulent and honest accounting.
2 The model
We consider sports contests where athletes can use performance-enhancing drugs
to improve their game. The population of athletes is of two types: weak and
strong. The fraction of strong players is q and assumed to be constant over time,
that is, we do not consider the evolutionary dynamics of strong and weak players,
rather we are interested how the use of performance-enhancing drugs within the
strong and within the weak population evolve over time. We assume two large but
finite populations of individuals, one such population for the weak and one for the
strong. The players are randomly drawn from the two populations and matched in
pairs.2 Accordingly, there are three possible match types: two strong players are
matched (ss), two weak players are matched (ww), and a strong player is matched
to a weak player (sw).
The players have von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences over winning and
losing the competition. The winning player receives utilityU and the losing player
receives zero utility. For simplicity, we assume that if no drugs are taken, a strong
players when matched to a weak player wins the game with certainty, and when
matched to another strong player he wins the contest with probability 1/2. Also,
2The analysis in a two-player framework is appropriate for many sports (boxing, tennis, martial
arts, etc.). It also applies to team sports, such as soccer or football, where the teammanager decides
whether her team will use performance-enhancing drugs. It may also apply to other sports, such
as cycling or downhill skiing, when two clear leaders compete for the first prize and the other
competitors have no influence on this decision.
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a weak player when matched to another weak player wins the contest with proba-
bility 1/2. When a doped player is matched to a clean player, regardless whether
this player is weak or strong, he wins the game with certainty. When two doped
players are matched, the winning probabilities are the same as when two clean
players are matched.3
Doping improves the performance of the players at cost k where 0 < k < U .
Cost k reflects the fact that athletes do not like to cheat: Each athlete prefers to
win without using performance-enhancing drugs, rather than to win with their
use. However, each athlete also prefers to win with performance-enhancing drugs
rather than to lose without, i.e., U > U − k > 0. The cost may also represent
expected health cost and monetary cost of drugs. In the following we normalize
U = 1.4
We assume that each individual is, at each instant of time, programmed to one
of the pure strategies which is either to take performance-enhancing drugs or to
stay clean. Let ps (pw) be the fraction of strong (weak) players that dopes. Denote
Ass the payoff matrix for a strong player who is matched to another strong player.
Asw is the payoff matrix for a strong player who meets a weak player, Aws is the
payoff matrix of a weak player who is matched to a strong player, and Aww is the
matrix of a weak player who is matched to another weak player. These payoff
matrices are
Ass = Aww =
[ 1
2 − k 1− k
0 12
]
, Asw =
[ 1− k 1− k
0 1
]
, Aws =
[ −k 1− k
0 0
]
.
Consider for example the Ass-matrix. The first entry in the first row is the expected
payoff of a strong player who is matched to another strong player when both
player dope: he bears the doping cost k and with probability 1/2 he wins the game.
The second entry in the first row represents the payoff when the strong player’s
partner is clean: in this case the player again bears the doing cost k and he wins
the game with certainty. The first entry in the second row is the expected payoff
of a strong player who is clean when matched to a strong player who dopes. The
payoff is zero because a clean player looses the game with certainty. The second
entry in the second row is the expected payoff of a strong player who is clean
3These assumption about how doping affects the winning probabilities are generalized in sec-
tion 4. They have no bearing on the qualitative features of the equilibria.
4In this sense, the cost of doping k are measured in units of utility the winner receives. None
of the properties of the equilibrium are affected by this normalization. The comparative study of
equilibrium dynamics with respect to k is thus equivalent to studying a reciprocal change of U
while keeping k constant.
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and matched to another strong and clean player. The payoff is 1/2 because both
players are equally likely to win the game. The other payoff-matrices have a
similar interpretation.
To proceed, denote with usd (uwd) the average payoff of strong (weak) players
that dope and usc (uwc) the average payoff of strong players that stay clean. The
average payoff of strong and of weak players players are denoted with us and uw,
respectively. These average payoffs are calculated as follows
usd = q (1, 0) Ass (ps, 1− ps)T + (1− q) (1, 0) Asw (pw, 1− pw)T ,
usc = q (0, 1) Ass (ps, 1− ps)T + (1− q) (0, 1) Asw (pw, 1− pw)T ,
us = psusd + (1− ps)usc,
uwd = q (1, 0) Aws (ps, 1− ps)T + (1− q) (1, 0) Aww (pw, 1− pw)T ,
uwc = q (0, 1) Aws (ps, 1− ps)T + (1− q) (0, 1) Aww (pw, 1− pw)T ,
uw = pwuwd + (1− pw)uwc.
(1)
For example, consider the average payoff of a strong player who dopes, usd . This
player is matched to another strong player with probability q and to a weak player
with probability 1−q. In the former case the expected payoff is (1, 0) Ass (ps, 1− ps)T
because the other strong player is a doper with probability ps . In the later case
the expected payoff is (1, 0) Asw (pw, 1− pw)T because the weak partner dopes
with probability pw.
The standard replicator dynamics is given by
.ps = ps (usd − us) = 12 (1− ps) ps (−2k + q + 2 (1− q) pw) ,
.pw = pw (uwd − uw) = 12 (1− pw) pw (1− 2k + q − 2qps) .
(2)
The idea behind (2) is that the fraction of doped agents of each type increases
if doping yields a larger average payoff than staying clean (if uid is larger than
uic, which is equivalent to uid > ui , for i = s, w); the fraction decreases if
staying clean is more profitable. The replicator dynamics goes back to a paper
by TAYLOR AND JONKER [1978]. It is today widely used in evolutionary game
theory to describe the dynamics of the composition of strategies in a population.5
The basic idea is that the share of a strategy that is more successful on average
increases over time.
5Other dynamics have also been investigated. A general approach is put forth by KANDORI,
MAILATH, AND ROB [1993].
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In the following we want to characterize the stationary states. For this pur-
pose denote the state space with P = [0, 1]2. Any point p := (ps, pw) ∈ P
represents a distribution of individuals in the two populations i ∈ {s, w}, across
the pure strategies d and c available to the agents. Inspection of (2) reveals that
the strategy profiles (1, 1), (1, 0), (0, 1), and (0, 0) are stationary states for all
(k, q).6 In addition, for some (k, q), there are also stationary states in the interior
of P . Define the set
(3) ♦ := {(k, q) | min{2− 2k, 2k} > q > max{1− 2k, 2k − 1}}.
If (k, q) ∈ ♦, the point
(4) ( pˆs, pˆw) :=
(1− 2k + q
2q ,
2k − q
2(1− q)
)
is stationary.
We now characterize the stability properties of the stationary states. Propo-
sitions 1 and 2 concern different areas of the parameter space that give rise to
different stability properties of the equilibria. It is helpful to define the following
sets (see Figure 1 where we have labelled them accordingly),
DD := {(k, q) | 1− 2k > q > 2k}, CC := {(k, q) | 2k − 1 > q > 2(1− k)},
dD := {(k, q) | q < min{1− 2k, 2k}}, cC := {(k, q) | q < min{2k − 1, 2(1− k)}},
Dc := {(k, q) | q > max{1− 2k, 2k}}, Cd := {(k, q) | q > max{2k − 1, 2(1− k)}}.
The letters refer to the equilibrium pure strategies of the strong and the weak play-
ers, respectively. Capital letters indicate that the respective strategy is dominant
in this particular region. Lowercase letters indicate that the strategy is only a best
reply. insert
Figure 1
around
here
Define further
Pdd = P \ {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0)} , Pcc = P \ {(0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)} ,
Pcd = P \ {(0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 1)} , Pdc = P \ {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1)} .
6If q = 1− 2k, then all points in {(1, z) | z ∈ [0, 1]} are also stationary states. Along the same
lines, the states in {(0, z) | z ∈ [0, 1]} are stationary if q = 2k − 1, the states in {(z, 1) | z ∈ [0, 1]}
are stationary if q = 2(1 − k), and the points in {(0, z) | z ∈ [0, 1]} are stationary if q = 2k.
Throughout the paper we ignore these special cases.
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Proposition 1
(i) If (k, q) ∈ DD ∪ dD, any initial state p ∈ Pdd converges to state (1, 1),
(ii) If (k, q) ∈ CC ∪ cC, any initial state p ∈ Pcc converges to state (0, 0),
(iii) If (k, q) ∈ Dc, any initial state p ∈ Pdc converges to state (1, 0),
(iv) If (k, q) ∈ Cd, any initial state p ∈ Pcd converges to state (0, 1).
Proof: We only prove statement (i) because the proofs of statements (ii) to (iv)
are analogous.
Case 1: (k, q) ∈ DD = {(k, q) | 1− 2k > q > 2k}. From (2) we get
.ps = 12 (1− ps) ps (−2k + q + 2 (1− q) pw) > (1− ps) ps (1− q) pw > 0,
.pw = 12 (1− pw) pw (1− 2k + q − 2qps) > (1− pw) pwq (1− ps) > 0.
If (k, q) ∈ DD, doping is a dominant strategy for both player types so that any
initial state p ∈ Pdd converges to (1, 1).
Case 2: (k, q) ∈ dD = {(k, q) | q < min{1− 2k, 2k}}. From (2) we get
.ps = 12 (1− ps) ps (−2k + q + 2 (1− q) pw) > 0 if pw >
2k − q
2 (1− q) > 0,
.pw = 12 (1− pw) pw (1− 2k + q − 2qps) > (1− pw) pwq (1− ps) > 0.
In this case the weak players have a dominant strategy to dope so that eventually
all weak players dope. The strong players have no dominant strategy. However,
for pw sufficiently large .ps > 0. Thus, if (k, q) ∈ dD, any p ∈ Pdd converges to
(1, 1). !
Proposition 1 establishes that the stationary point (1, 1) is almost globally sta-
ble if (k, q) ∈ DD ∪ dD. The “almost” refers to the fact that the unstable station-
ary states (1, 0), (0, 1), (0, 0) are not in the basin of attraction of (1, 1). Analogous
statements apply to the stationary points in the other regions defined above. They,
too, are either almost globally stable or unstable.
Proposition 2 Assume (k, q) ∈ ♦. The interior stationary state pˆ is Lyapunov
stable, but not asymptotically stable. Moreover, for each p ∈ intP , there is a
cyclical orbit O ⊂ intP which is a Lyapunov stable set.
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Proof: We first show that pˆ is a Lyapunov stable point. It suffices to show that the
system (2) has an associated Lyapunov function for pˆ [defined in (4)] with zero
time derivative.
Consider the following function,
L(p) := L( pˆ)− L(p),(5)
with L(p) := (1− 2k + q) ln(ps) + (−1+ 2k + q) ln(1− ps)
+(2− 2k − q) ln(1− pw) + (2k − q) ln(pw).
Step 1: L attains a global minimum at pˆ.
By definition, L( pˆ) = 0. We need to show that L(p) > 0 for all p '= pˆ. To
establish this, note that the Hessian of L,[1−2k+q
p2s
+ −1+2k+q
(1−ps)2 0
0 2−2k−q
(1−pw)2 +
2k−q
p2w
]
,
is positive definite everywhere if (k, q) ∈ ♦. Moreover, the gradient of L vanishes
at pˆ. Thus, L attains a global minimum at pˆ.
Step 2:
.L = 0 along a solution path.
We have
.L(p) = ∂L
∂ps
.ps + ∂L∂pw
.pw,
where .ps and
.pw are defined in (2). We want to show that
.L(p) = 0 for all
p ∈ intP if (k, q) ∈ ♦. To do so note that
∂L
∂ps
.ps = −12(1− 2k + q)(1− ps)(−2k + q + 2(1− q)pw)
+ 12(−1+ 2k + q)ps(−2k + q + 2(1− q)pw),
∂L
∂pw
.pw = 12(2− 2k − q)pw(1− 2k + q − 2qps)
− (2k − q)12(1− pw)(1− 2k + q − 2qps).
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Simplifying yields
∂L
∂ps
.ps = −12 (1− 2k + q − 2qps) (−2k + q + 2 (1− q) pw) = −
∂L
∂pw
.pw.
Evidently, ∂L∂ps
.ps + ∂L∂pw
.pw = 0, establishing the claim.
Steps 1 and 2 establish that L is a Lyapunov function for pˆ, hence pˆ is a Lya-
punov stable point. We now show that there are Lyapunov stable orbits around pˆ.
Step 3: For each p¯ ∈ intP there exists a cyclical orbit O ⊂ intP which is a
Lyapunov stable set [WEIBULL, 1995, p. 244].
Let O be the solution orbit associated to some fixed ( p¯s, p¯w) := p¯ ∈ intP .
Let p˜ := ( p˜s, p˜w). Formally,
O :=
{
p˜
∣∣∣ ∃T p˜ = p¯ + ∫ T
0
.pdt
}
,
where .p is given by (2). O is the collection of all p˜ that the system reaches
sometime in the future if we start out from p¯. By step 2 we have
.L(p) = 0 along
any such solution orbit. It therefore follows that L(p) =: λO is constant for all
p ∈ O. Define now a Lyapunov function for this orbit as follows,
LO(p) := (L(p)− λO)2 .
Clearly, LO(p) ≥ 0, with equality if and only if p ∈ O. Moreover,
.LO(p) = 0,
hence O is a Lyapunov stable set, but not an asymptotically stable set. !
The stable cyclical orbits of Proposition 2 are reminiscent of the evolutionary
dynamics of the matching pennies game. This is no coincidence, because, in
essence, the doping game has the same structure. The strong player wants to
dope only if the weak player does. For the weak player, however, doping is only
interesting if the strong player stays clean. The point pˆ, which is stationary if
(k, q) ∈ ♦, is equivalent to the mixed Nash equilibrium of the standard matching
pennies game.
The comparative statics of the stationary points are somewhat surprising. In-
terestingly, the strong and weak players react differently to a change in the cost
of doping. Given q , the fraction of strong players that use doping monotonically
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decrease as the cost of doping k increases. The same is not true for the popula-
tion of weak players. If q > 1/2, all weak players use doping in the stationary
point if k < (1 − q)/2. By increasing the cost of doping marginally above this
threshold, the fraction of weak players using doping in the stationary equilibrium
discontinuously drops to zero, as long as (1 − q)/2 < k < q/2. By increasing k
further we enter the ♦-region. In this region, the fraction of weak players using
doping in the interior stationary state pˆ increases with the cost of doping. The rea-
son for this counterintuitive comparative statics is that the decrease in the fraction
of strong players that use doping makes doping more attractive for weak players.
This effect is stronger than the direct cost effect, so that, in sum, the fraction of
weak players that use doping increases with the cost of doping in this region.
Note also that if (k, q) ∈ ♦ and k < 1/2, then ps exceeds pw in the interior
strategy stationary point. Thus, it is possible that strong players are more likely to
use performance-enhancing drugs than weak players.
3 Interpretation
Propositions 1 and 2 are most easy to understand in connection with Figure 1.
Proposition 1 establishes that if the doping cost k and the fraction of strong players
q are in area DD or dD, then all agents dope eventually. The intuitive reason for
this result is quite clear for region DD. In this region, the cost of doping k is
sufficiently small so that both types of agents have a dominant strategy dope. This
means that, no matter what the opponent does, doping generates a larger average
payoff than staying clean. Clearly, in such a situation, the replicator dynamics
causes the doping frequency to increase monotonically over time, until eventually
all players dope.
The argument is a little bit more involved for region dD. In this region, the frac-
tion of weak players is large. Therefore, any player is most likely to be matched
with a weak player. Since doping costs are relatively small, weak players have
a dominant strategy to dope. Consequently, the replicator dynamics causes weak
types to dope with ever higher frequency, until eventually all of them dope. In
contrast, the strong players do not have a dominant strategy in this region. For
them, doping is optimal only if sufficiently many weak players dope. But since
the evolutionary dynamics leads weak types to dope no matter what, strong play-
ers will follow and eventually all of them dope as well.
The logic of region Dc, which features a large fraction of strong players, is as
follows: here, only the strong players have a dominant strategy to dope because
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players are most likely to be matched with strong players. Consequently, the
replicator dynamics leads strong types to dope with ever higher frequency, until
eventually all of them dope. In contrast, for weak players, doping is profitable
only if strong types stay clean, because weak players cannot win against doped
strong players, even if they use doping. Since the probability of being matched
with a strong player is high, doping does not pay on average for weak players if
strong players dope with sufficiently high probability. As a result, the evolutionary
dynamics drives all weak players to stay clean eventually. The intuitive reasons
for regions CC, cC, and Cd is analogous.
Proposition 2 describes the equilibria if the parameters are in region ♦. The
key concept here is Lyapunov stability: “Intuitively, a state p ∈ P is Lyapunov
stable if no small change in the population composition can lead it away, and
p ∈ P is asymptotically stable if moreover any sufficiently small such change re-
sults in a movement back toward p.” [WEIBULL, 1995, p. 75, notation adapted].
Lyapunov stability is weaker than asymptotic stability because it does not require
convergence. An extension of this definition is the concept of a Lyapunov stable
set: consider a closed set O ⊂ P . Suppose the dynamics is such that the equilib-
rium stays withinO if we start from p ∈ O. We call such a setO a solution orbit.
Suppose further that a small move from p to p′ leads to a solution orbit O′ which
is close toO. If this is the case, we say thatO is a Lyapunov stable set [WEIBULL,
1995, p. 244]. Intuitively, a Lyapunov stable set is an equilibrium with cycles that
is not changed a lot by small shocks. insert
Figure 2
around
here
Proposition 2 establishes that the points pˆ as defined in (4) are Lyapunov stable
points if the parameters of the game are in the region ♦. Moreover, in this region,
there are also Lyapunov stable sets that result in cyclical equilibria, as depicted in
Figure 2. From (2) and (4) we can determine that in equilibrium the state circles
around these orbits in clockwise direction. This induces cyclical ups and downs
of pw and ps , but with a phase shift.
4 Generalizations
In this section we consider three generalizations. First we consider the case of less
than perfectly effective drugs. Then we address the effects of possible detection
and punishment of doped players. Finally, we extend the analysis to populations
with three different ability levels.
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4.1 Less effective drugs
So far we have assumed that an athlete that takes performance-enhancing drugs
wins the game with certainty if his competitor is clean. We now consider less
effective drugs, and we also assume that a strong player matched to a weak player
wins the game with probability σ , where 1 ≥ σ ≥ 0.5. Denote by δ ≥ 0.5
the probability that a doped strong (weak) player wins when matched to a clean
strong (weak) player. The difference δ − 0.5 specifies the effectiveness of per-
formance-enhancing drugs in the sense of measuring the increase of a player’s
winning probability when only this agent dopes. Denote further δsw (δws) the
probability that a doped strong (weak) player wins when matched to a clean weak
(strong) player, where δsw ≥ σ (δws ≥ 1 − σ ). Note that in the previous sec-
tion we have assumed σ = δ = δsw = δws = 1, i.e. we have assumed maximal
effectiveness of performance-enhancing drugs. In this section we argue that noth-
ing changes qualitatively if we assume that performance-enhancing drugs are less
than infinitely effective.
With these new specifications of the winning probabilities the standard repli-
cator dynamics is
.ps = 12(1− ps)ps[−2k + (2δ − 1)q
+ 2(1− q)(δsw − σ )− 2(1− q)(1+ δsw − δws − 2σ )pw],
.pw = 12(1− pw)pw[−2k + (2δ − 1)(1− q)
+ 2q(δws + σ − 1) + 2q(1+ δsw − δws − 2σ )ps].
(6)
Inspection of (6) reveals that these dynamics has the same qualitative properties
as in the previous section. In particular the profiles (1, 1), (1, 0), (0, 1), and (0, 0)
are stationary states for all (k, q) ∈ P . Also, for some (k, q), there are interior
distributions ( ˆˆps, ˆˆpw) that are stationary,
ˆˆps = 2k − (2δ − 1)(1− q)− 2q(δws + σ − 1)2q(1+ δsw − δws − 2σ ) ,
ˆˆpw = −2k + (2δ − 1)q + 2(1− q)(δsw − σ )2(1− q)(1+ δsw − δws − 2σ ) .
Note that Propositions 1 and 2 continue to hold because (6) has the same qual-
itative properties as (2). That is to say, all combinations of non-interior strategies
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are stationary points, but, depending on (k, q), at most one of them is asymptot-
ically stable. For some (k, q), there is an interior stationary point which is Lya-
punov stable, but not asymptotically stable. In that case, there are also Lyapunov
stable cyclical orbits hovering around the stationary point.
4.2 Detection and punishments
We have not addressed the possibility of detection and punishments until now. We
add this possibility now as follows. Suppose tests are performed after the contest
with probability τ . The test detects a doped player with probability β, so 1− β is
the probability of false negatives. The test may also produce false positives, that
is, erroneously identify clean players as doped, with probability α. A perfect test
would have α = 0 and β = 1. The test is at least to some extent informative if
β > α, and this is what we assume. An agent who is identified as doped is subject
to a punishment pi .
Let u˜sd denote the average payoff of strong doped players, and likewise for
u˜sc, u˜wd , u˜wc. The expected punishment of doped players is given by the product
of the probability that a test is performed τ , times the probability of being detected
β, times the punishment pi , so u˜sd = usd − τβpi and u˜wd = uwd − τβpi . For
clean players, the expected punishment is ταpi , so u˜sc = usc − ταpi and u˜wc =
uwc− ταpi , where ui j are given by (1). As before, u˜s := psu˜sd + (1− ps)u˜sc and
u˜w := pwu˜wd + (1− pw)u˜wc denote average payoffs of strong and weak players,
respectively. The replicator dynamics is now
.ps = ps (u˜sd − u˜s) = 12 (1− ps) ps (−2(k + τ (β − α)pi) + q + 2 (1− q) pw) ,
.pw = pw (u˜wd − u˜w) = 12 (1− pw) pw (1− 2(k + τ (β − α)pi) + q − 2qps) .
(7)
Comparing this with (2) reveals that tests and punishments have precisely the
same effect on the dynamics as increasing the cost k by τ (β − α)pi . This implies
in particular that increasing the punishment pi or the testing probability τ or the
accuracy of the test (β − α) may actually lead to more doping in some cases.
We have introduced testing and punishments in a particularly simple fashion
here. A possible variation is to assume that the loosing party inherits the prize if
the losing party passes the doping test but the winning party does not. The dy-
namics of this case (a static version of this situation is the subject of BERENTSEN
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[2002]) would be quantitatively different from our model, but the main qualita-
tive features would probably remain: there are equilibria in which the high ability
players are more likely to cheat, and there can be Lyapunov-stable cycles.
4.3 Three population games
So far we have restricted attention to games with only two types of players. But
the logic of doping games is not restricted to this case, and the analysis can be
extended to a richer selection of types. A doping game with three types of play-
ers, for instance, would feature a top talented population, a middle class talented
population, and a weakly talented population, with given population shares q1, q2,
and q3 := 1 − q1 − q2. Two randomly chosen players from the whole popula-
tion play the contest. The winning probabilities are influenced by the talent of the
players, and whether they use doping or not.
Such a game has many parameters: The population shares, the cost of dop-
ing, and the winning probabilities of the different types of agents in all possible
matches. Essentially, nothing changes compared to the two population doping
game. For some parameters we find almost globally stable strategy stationary
points on the boundary of the strategy space. For some parameters, there are sta-
tionary points that are interior for two player types (meaning that a portion of
players of this type stay clean while others dope), but all players that belong to
the third type all do the same (all dope or stay clean). And for some parameters,
there are stationary points where all three player types end up in the interior of the
strategy space, indicating that for each type, some dope and so do not. insert
Figure 3
around
here
Moreover, one can also generate Lyapunov stable cyclical orbits around such
interior stationary points. As an illustration, Figure 3 depicts such an orbit. This
example assumes equal population shares, q1 = q2 = q3 = 1/3, and costs of
doping k = 1/3. Doping has the effect of allowing a weak player to win for sure
against a clean mid talent type, but not against a clean top type. A doped mid
talent type wins with certainty against a clean top type. In this example, most of
the time almost all top talent players use doping, while weakly talented people
almost never use doping. The fraction of mid talented players that dope is initially
large but decreases as long as the fraction of strong players that use doping is
large. When the fraction of mid talented doped people has decreased enough, the
benefits of doping for weak players increases because with doping they have a
chance to win if they meet a clean mid talented person. Thus, the weak players
begin to use doping. For the top talented people, the benefits of doping become
smaller, however, because so few mid talented people use doping. Hence, the
14
share of top types that use doping reduces rapidly. This, however, incites mid
talented players to resume doping, and we are back to square one.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we analyze an evolutionary game between two athlete types who can
use performance-enhancing drugs at a cost. We find that, depending on parameter
values, different asymptotically stable strategy equilibria exist on the boundary
of the strategy space, or if not, then an interior strategy equilibrium exists which
is only weakly (Lyapunov, but not asymptotically) stable. In that case, there are
also cyclical orbits, where doping and staying clean alternate. The reason for this
behavior is that the two population game has a structure similar to the matching
pennies game, unlike the one population doping game, which has the structure of
the prisoner’s dilemma.
Although we couch the discussion of the model in terms of sports, the model
does have applications outside of sports. The strategic incentives of a manager
or firm to misreport profit is one example. With this interpretation, our model
suggests that with some parameter combinations, high-ability managers may be
more likely to cheat. Also, we may observe waves of cheating and honesty.
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1 q = 1− 2k
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3 q = 2− 2k
4 q = 2k − 1
Figure 1: Stable points.
Figure 2: Orbits for different costs (left) and different initial states (right).
Figure 3: Cycles in three population doping games.
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